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Simple HTTP client with HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2, and HTTP/3 support
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c_src/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bcm_interface.h
// Copyright 2024 The BoringSSL Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BCM_INTERFACE_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BCM_INTERFACE_H
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/mldsa.h>
#include <openssl/mlkem.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/sha2.h>
// This header will eventually become the interface between BCM and the
// rest of libcrypto. More cleanly separating the two is still a work in
// progress (see https://crbug.com/boringssl/722) so, at the moment, we
// consider this no different from any other header in BCM.
//
// Over time, calls from libcrypto to BCM will all move to this header
// and the separation will become more meaningful.
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// Enumerated types for return values from bcm functions, both infallible
// and fallible functions. Two success values are used to correspond to the
// FIPS service indicator. For the moment, the official service indicator
// remains the counter, not these values. Once we fully transition to
// these return values from bcm we will change that.
enum class bcm_infallible_t {
approved,
not_approved,
};
enum class bcm_status_t {
approved,
not_approved,
failure,
};
typedef enum bcm_status_t bcm_status;
typedef enum bcm_infallible_t bcm_infallible;
inline int bcm_success(bcm_status status) {
return status == bcm_status::approved || status == bcm_status::not_approved;
}
inline bcm_status_t bcm_as_approved_status(int result) {
return result ? bcm_status::approved : bcm_status::failure;
}
inline bcm_status_t bcm_as_not_approved_status(int result) {
return result ? bcm_status::not_approved : bcm_status::failure;
}
// Random number generator.
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
// We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to whiten.
// TODO(bbe): disentangle this value which is used to calculate the size of the
// stack buffer in RAND_need entropy based on a calculation.
#define BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD 10
#endif // BORINGSSL_FIPS
// BCM_rand_load_entropy supplies |entropy_len| bytes of entropy to the BCM
// module. The |want_additional_input| parameter is true iff the entropy was
// obtained from a source other than the system, e.g. directly from the CPU.
bcm_infallible BCM_rand_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
int want_additional_input);
// BCM_rand_bytes is the same as the public |RAND_bytes| function, other
// than returning a bcm_infallible status indicator.
bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
// BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng attempts to fill |out| with |len| bytes of entropy from
// the CPU hardware random number generator if one is present.
// bcm_status_approved is returned on success, and a failure status is
// returned otherwise.
bcm_status BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng(uint8_t *out, size_t len);
// BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data samples from the RNG after mixing 32
// bytes from |user_additional_data| in.
bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t user_additional_data[32]);
// SHA-1
// BCM_sha1_init initialises |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_init(SHA_CTX *sha);
// SHA1_transform is a low-level function that performs a single, SHA-1
// block transformation using the state from |sha| and |SHA_CBLOCK| bytes from
// |block|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_transform(SHA_CTX *c, const uint8_t data[SHA_CBLOCK]);
// BCM_sha1_update adds |len| bytes from |data| to |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
// BCM_sha1_final adds the final padding to |sha| and writes the resulting
// digest to |out|, which must have at least |SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of space.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_final(uint8_t out[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA_CTX *c);
// BCM_fips_186_2_prf derives |out_len| bytes from |xkey| using the PRF
// defined in FIPS 186-2, Appendix 3.1, with change notice 1 applied. The b
// parameter is 160 and seed, XKEY, is also 160 bits. The optional XSEED user
// input is all zeros.
//
// The PRF generates a sequence of 320-bit numbers. Each number is encoded as a
// 40-byte string in big-endian and then concatenated to form |out|. If
// |out_len| is not a multiple of 40, the result is truncated. This matches the
// construction used in Section 7 of RFC 4186 and Section 7 of RFC 4187.
//
// This PRF is based on SHA-1, a weak hash function, and should not be used
// in new protocols. It is provided for compatibility with some legacy EAP
// methods.
bcm_infallible BCM_fips_186_2_prf(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const uint8_t xkey[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]);
// SHA-224
// BCM_sha224_unit initialises |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha224_init(SHA256_CTX *sha);
// BCM_sha224_update adds |len| bytes from |data| to |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha224_update(SHA256_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
// BCM_sha224_final adds the final padding to |sha| and writes the resulting
// digest to |out|, which must have at least |SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of
// space. It aborts on programmer error.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha224_final(uint8_t out[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH],
SHA256_CTX *sha);
// SHA-256
// BCM_sha256_init initialises |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_init(SHA256_CTX *sha);
// BCM_sha256_update adds |len| bytes from |data| to |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_update(SHA256_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
// BCM_sha256_final adds the final padding to |sha| and writes the resulting
// digest to |out|, which must have at least |SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of
// space. It aborts on programmer error.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_final(uint8_t out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
SHA256_CTX *sha);
// BCM_sha256_transform is a low-level function that performs a single, SHA-256
// block transformation using the state from |sha| and |SHA256_CBLOCK| bytes
// from |block|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_transform(SHA256_CTX *sha,
const uint8_t block[SHA256_CBLOCK]);
// BCM_sha256_transform_blocks is a low-level function that takes |num_blocks| *
// |SHA256_CBLOCK| bytes of data and performs SHA-256 transforms on it to update
// |state|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha256_transform_blocks(uint32_t state[8],
const uint8_t *data,
size_t num_blocks);
// SHA-384.
// BCM_sha384_init initialises |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha384_init(SHA512_CTX *sha);
// BCM_sha384_update adds |len| bytes from |data| to |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha384_update(SHA512_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
// BCM_sha384_final adds the final padding to |sha| and writes the resulting
// digest to |out|, which must have at least |SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of
// space. It may abort on programmer error.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha384_final(uint8_t out[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH],
SHA512_CTX *sha);
// SHA-512.
// BCM_sha512_init initialises |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_init(SHA512_CTX *sha);
// BCM_sha512_update adds |len| bytes from |data| to |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_update(SHA512_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len);
// BCM_sha512_final adds the final padding to |sha| and writes the resulting
// digest to |out|, which must have at least |SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of
// space.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_final(uint8_t out[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH],
SHA512_CTX *sha);
// BCM_sha512_transform is a low-level function that performs a single, SHA-512
// block transformation using the state from |sha| and |SHA512_CBLOCK| bytes
// from |block|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_transform(SHA512_CTX *sha,
const uint8_t block[SHA512_CBLOCK]);
// SHA-512-256
//
// See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf section 5.3.6
// BCM_sha512_256_init initialises |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_256_init(SHA512_CTX *sha);
// BCM_sha512_256_update adds |len| bytes from |data| to |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_256_update(SHA512_CTX *sha, const void *data,
size_t len);
// BCM_sha512_256_final adds the final padding to |sha| and writes the resulting
// digest to |out|, which must have at least |SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of
// space. It may abort on programmer error.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha512_256_final(uint8_t out[SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
SHA512_CTX *sha);
// ML-DSA
//
// Where not commented, these functions have the same signature as the
// corresponding public function.
// BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES is the number of bytes of uniformly
// random entropy necessary to generate a signature in randomized mode.
#define BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES 32
// BCM_MLDSA65_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an encoded ML-DSA-65
// private key.
#define BCM_MLDSA65_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 4032
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_private_key_from_seed(
MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_public_from_private(
MLDSA65_public_key *out_public_key, const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
// BCM_mldsa65_public_of_private returns the public half of |private_key|.
const MLDSA65_public_key *BCM_mldsa65_public_of_private(
const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa65_check_key_fips(MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_private_key_from_seed_fips(
MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa65_sign(uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify(
const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES], const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa65_prehash_init(
MLDSA65_prehash *out_prehash_ctx, const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa65_prehash_update(
MLDSA65_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa65_prehash_finalize(
uint8_t out_msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES], MLDSA65_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign_message_representative(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key,
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify_message_representative(
const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa65_marshal_public_key(CBB *out, const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa65_parse_public_key(MLDSA65_public_key *public_key, CBS *in);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa65_parse_private_key(MLDSA65_private_key *private_key, CBS *in);
// BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy generates a public/private key pair
// using the given seed, writes the encoded public key to
// |out_encoded_public_key| and sets |out_private_key| to the private key.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLDSA65_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
// BCM_mldsa5_sign_internal signs |msg| using |private_key| and writes the
// signature to |out_encoded_signature|. The |context_prefix| and |context| are
// prefixed to the message, in that order, before signing. The |randomizer|
// value can be set to zero bytes in order to make a deterministic signature, or
// else filled with entropy for the usual |MLDSA_sign| behavior.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign_internal(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign_mu_internal(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key,
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES],
const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
// BCM_mldsa5_verify_internal verifies that |encoded_signature| is a valid
// signature of |msg| by |public_key|. The |context_prefix| and |context| are
// prefixed to the message before verification, in that order.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify_internal(
const MLDSA65_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t encoded_signature[MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
// BCM_mldsa65_marshal_private_key serializes |private_key| to |out| in the
// NIST format for ML-DSA-65 private keys.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_marshal_private_key(
CBB *out, const MLDSA65_private_key *private_key);
// BCM_mldsa65_public_keys_equal returns one if |a| and |b| are equal and zero
// otherwise.
int BCM_mldsa65_public_keys_equal(const MLDSA65_public_key *a,
const MLDSA65_public_key *b);
// BCM_MLDSA87_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an encoded ML-DSA-87
// private key.
#define BCM_MLDSA87_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 4896
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_private_key_from_seed(
MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_public_from_private(
MLDSA87_public_key *out_public_key, const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
// BCM_mldsa87_public_of_private returns the public half of |private_key|.
const MLDSA87_public_key *BCM_mldsa87_public_of_private(
const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa87_check_key_fips(MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_private_key_from_seed_fips(
MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa87_sign(uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa87_verify(const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t *signature, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa87_prehash_init(
MLDSA87_prehash *out_prehash_ctx, const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa87_prehash_update(
MLDSA87_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa87_prehash_finalize(
uint8_t out_msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES], MLDSA87_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign_message_representative(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key,
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_verify_message_representative(
const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa87_marshal_public_key(CBB *out, const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa87_parse_public_key(MLDSA87_public_key *public_key, CBS *in);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa87_parse_private_key(MLDSA87_private_key *private_key, CBS *in);
// BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy generates a public/private key pair
// using the given seed, writes the encoded public key to
// |out_encoded_public_key| and sets |out_private_key| to the private key.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLDSA87_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
// BCM_mldsa87_sign_internal signs |msg| using |private_key| and writes the
// signature to |out_encoded_signature|. The |context_prefix| and |context| are
// prefixed to the message, in that order, before signing. The |randomizer|
// value can be set to zero bytes in order to make a deterministic signature, or
// else filled with entropy for the usual |MLDSA_sign| behavior.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign_internal(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign_mu_internal(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key,
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES],
const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
// BCM_mldsa87_verify_internal verifies that |encoded_signature| is a valid
// signature of |msg| by |public_key|. The |context_prefix| and |context| are
// prefixed to the message before verification, in that order.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_verify_internal(
const MLDSA87_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t encoded_signature[MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
// BCM_mldsa87_marshal_private_key serializes |private_key| to |out| in the
// NIST format for ML-DSA-87 private keys.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_marshal_private_key(
CBB *out, const MLDSA87_private_key *private_key);
// BCM_mldsa87_public_keys_equal returns one if |a| and |b| are equal and zero
// otherwise.
int BCM_mldsa87_public_keys_equal(const MLDSA87_public_key *a,
const MLDSA87_public_key *b);
// BCM_MLDSA44_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an encoded ML-DSA-44
// private key.
#define BCM_MLDSA44_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 2560
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_private_key_from_seed(
MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_public_from_private(
MLDSA44_public_key *out_public_key, const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
// BCM_mldsa44_public_of_private returns the public half of |private_key|.
const MLDSA44_public_key *BCM_mldsa44_public_of_private(
const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa44_check_key_fips(MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES], MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_private_key_from_seed_fips(
MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key, const uint8_t seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa44_sign(uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa44_verify(const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t *signature, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa44_prehash_init(
MLDSA44_prehash *out_prehash_ctx, const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa44_prehash_update(
MLDSA44_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void BCM_mldsa44_prehash_finalize(
uint8_t out_msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES], MLDSA44_prehash *inout_prehash_ctx);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_sign_message_representative(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key,
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_verify_message_representative(
const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa44_marshal_public_key(CBB *out, const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa44_parse_public_key(MLDSA44_public_key *public_key, CBS *in);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mldsa44_parse_private_key(MLDSA44_private_key *private_key, CBS *in);
// BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_external_entropy generates a public/private key pair
// using the given seed, writes the encoded public key to
// |out_encoded_public_key| and sets |out_private_key| to the private key.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_external_entropy(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_generate_key_external_entropy_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLDSA44_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t entropy[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]);
// BCM_mldsa44_sign_internal signs |msg| using |private_key| and writes the
// signature to |out_encoded_signature|. The |context_prefix| and |context| are
// prefixed to the message, in that order, before signing. The |randomizer|
// value can be set to zero bytes in order to make a deterministic signature, or
// else filled with entropy for the usual |MLDSA_sign| behavior.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_sign_internal(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_sign_mu_internal(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key,
const uint8_t msg_rep[MLDSA_MU_BYTES],
const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]);
// BCM_mldsa44_verify_internal verifies that |encoded_signature| is a valid
// signature of |msg| by |public_key|. The |context_prefix| and |context| are
// prefixed to the message before verification, in that order.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_verify_internal(
const MLDSA44_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t encoded_signature[MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
// BCM_mldsa44_marshal_private_key serializes |private_key| to |out| in the
// NIST format for ML-DSA-44 private keys.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mldsa44_marshal_private_key(
CBB *out, const MLDSA44_private_key *private_key);
// BCM_mldsa44_public_keys_equal returns one if |a| and |b| are equal and zero
// otherwise.
int BCM_mldsa44_public_keys_equal(const MLDSA44_public_key *a,
const MLDSA44_public_key *b);
// ML-KEM
//
// Where not commented, these functions have the same signature as the
// corresponding public function.
// BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY is the number of bytes of uniformly random entropy
// necessary to encapsulate a secret. The entropy will be leaked to the
// decapsulating party.
#define BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY 32
// BCM_MLKEM768_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the length of the data produced by
// |BCM_mlkem768_marshal_private_key|.
#define BCM_MLKEM768_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 2400
// BCM_MLKEM1024_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the length of the data produced by
// |BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_private_key|.
#define BCM_MLKEM1024_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 3168
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem768_generate_key(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem768_private_key_from_seed(MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem768_check_fips(const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
BCM_mlkem768_public_from_private(MLKEM768_public_key *out_public_key,
const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
BCM_mlkem768_encap(uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem768_decap(uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem768_marshal_public_key(
CBB *out, const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem768_parse_public_key(MLKEM768_public_key *out_public_key, CBS *in);
// BCM_mlkem768_parse_private_key parses a private key, in NIST's format for
// private keys, from |in| and writes the result to |out_private_key|. It
// returns one on success or zero on parse error or if there are trailing bytes
// in |in|. This format is verbose and should be avoided. Private keys should be
// stored as seeds and parsed using |BCM_mlkem768_private_key_from_seed|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem768_parse_private_key(MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key, CBS *in);
// BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_external_seed is a deterministic function to create
// a pair of ML-KEM-768 keys, using the supplied seed. The seed needs to be
// uniformly random. This function should only be used for tests; regular
// callers should use the non-deterministic |BCM_mlkem768_generate_key|
// directly.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem768_generate_key_external_seed(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLKEM768_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]);
// BCM_mlkem768_encap_external_entropy behaves like |MLKEM768_encap|, but uses
// |MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY| bytes of |entropy| for randomization. The decapsulating
// side will be able to recover |entropy| in full. This function should only be
// used for tests, regular callers should use the non-deterministic
// |BCM_mlkem768_encap| directly.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem768_encap_external_entropy(
uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
const MLKEM768_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]);
// BCM_mlkem768_marshal_private_key serializes |private_key| to |out| in the
// NIST format for ML-KEM-768 private keys. (Note that one can also save just
// the seed value produced by |BCM_mlkem768_generate_key|, which is
// significantly smaller.)
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem768_marshal_private_key(
CBB *out, const MLKEM768_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_fips(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t optional_out_seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES],
MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem1024_check_fips(const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem1024_private_key_from_seed(MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
BCM_mlkem1024_public_from_private(MLKEM1024_public_key *out_public_key,
const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible
BCM_mlkem1024_encap(uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem1024_decap(uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_public_key(
CBB *out, const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status
BCM_mlkem1024_parse_public_key(MLKEM1024_public_key *out_public_key, CBS *in);
// BCM_mlkem1024_parse_private_key parses a private key, in NIST's format for
// private keys, from |in| and writes the result to |out_private_key|. It
// returns one on success or zero on parse error or if there are trailing bytes
// in |in|. This format is verbose and should be avoided. Private keys should be
// stored as seeds and parsed using |BCM_mlkem1024_private_key_from_seed|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_parse_private_key(
MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key, CBS *in);
// BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_external_seed is a deterministic function to
// create a pair of ML-KEM-1024 keys, using the supplied seed. The seed needs to
// be uniformly random. This function should only be used for tests, regular
// callers should use the non-deterministic |BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key|
// directly.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key_external_seed(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[MLKEM1024_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
MLKEM1024_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t seed[MLKEM_SEED_BYTES]);
// BCM_mlkem1024_encap_external_entropy behaves like |MLKEM1024_encap|, but uses
// |MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY| bytes of |entropy| for randomization. The
// decapsulating side will be able to recover |entropy| in full. This function
// should only be used for tests, regular callers should use the
// non-deterministic |BCM_mlkem1024_encap| directly.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_mlkem1024_encap_external_entropy(
uint8_t out_ciphertext[MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES],
uint8_t out_shared_secret[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES],
const MLKEM1024_public_key *public_key,
const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLKEM_ENCAP_ENTROPY]);
// BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_private_key serializes |private_key| to |out| in the
// NIST format for ML-KEM-1024 private keys. (Note that one can also save just
// the seed value produced by |BCM_mlkem1024_generate_key|, which is
// significantly smaller.)
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_mlkem1024_marshal_private_key(
CBB *out, const MLKEM1024_private_key *private_key);
// SLH-DSA
// Output length of the hash function.
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N 16
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N 32
// The number of bytes at the beginning of M', the augmented message, before the
// context.
#define BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN 2
// SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an
// SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key.
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES 32
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES 64
// BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES is the number of bytes in an
// SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s private key.
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 64
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES 128
// BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES is the number of bytes in an
// SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature.
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES 7856
#define BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES 49856
// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed generates an SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
// key pair from a 48-byte seed and writes the result to |out_public_key| and
// |out_secret_key|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]);
// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed_fips does the same thing as
// `BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed` but implements the required
// second check before generating a key by testing for nullptr arguments.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed_fips(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed_fips(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]);
// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal acts like |SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_sign| but
// accepts an explicit entropy input, which can be PK.seed (bytes 32..48 of
// the private key) to generate deterministic signatures. It also takes the
// input message in three parts so that the "internal" version of the signing
// function, from section 9.2, can be implemented. The |header| argument may be
// NULL to omit it.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(
uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign_internal(
uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]);
// BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal acts like |SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_verify| but
// takes the input message in three parts so that the "internal" version of the
// verification function, from section 9.3, can be implemented. The |header|
// argument may be NULL to omit it.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify_internal(
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_fips(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_fips(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_public_from_private(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_public_from_private(
uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign(
uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign(
uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify(
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify(
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_sign(
uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_prehash_sign(
uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_verify(
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_prehash_verify(
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len);
// AES
// BCM_aes_encrypt encrypts a single block from |in| to |out| with |key|. The
// |in| and |out| pointers may overlap.
bcm_infallible BCM_aes_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
const AES_KEY *key);
// BCM_aes_decrypt decrypts a single block from |in| to |out| with |key|. The
// |in| and |out| pointers may overlap.
bcm_infallible BCM_aes_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
const AES_KEY *key);
// BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key configures |aeskey| to encrypt with the |bits|-bit
// key, |key|. |key| must point to |bits|/8 bytes. It will return failure if
// |bits| is an invalid AES key size.
bcm_status BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits,
AES_KEY *aeskey);
// BCM_aes_set_decrypt_key configures |aeskey| to decrypt with the |bits|-bit
// key, |key|. |key| must point to |bits|/8 bytes. It will return failure if
// |bits| is an invalid AES key size.
bcm_status BCM_aes_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits,
AES_KEY *aeskey);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BCM_INTERFACE_H