bounded_authority_protocol

# Contributing

Contributions must preserve the pure deterministic verifier boundary, closed versioned formats,
fixed value-free errors, and independent conformance requirements in the
[protocol charter](docs/design/protocol-charter.md) and [governance policy](docs/governance.md).

Before a pull request:

1. open a design discussion before protocol, cryptography, canonicalization, or conformance changes;
2. add allow, deny, malformed-input, and mutation-red tests;
3. update normative vectors and obtain independent exact-byte verification when wire bytes change;
4. run `mix deps.get` and `mix quality`;
5. update the changelog and every affected contract document.

Application-profile changes also update their normative specification, certified corpus and digest,
all five implementations, README/guides/Livebook, and the cross-profile rejection proofs. Run
`mix local_loopback_http.verify` to exercise real IPv4 and IPv6 listeners with ephemeral keys; a
self-round-trip or canned HTTP response is not interoperability or transport evidence.

The declared Elixir range is `~> 1.18` (1.18/1.19/1.20) and the supported Erlang/OTP majors are
**27, 28, 29** — floor-limited by the stdlib `:json` module (OTP 27+) and enforced by
`config/config.exs` at config load, before anything compiles; the assert is not shipped in the Hex
package, so consumers enforce their own. The mix.exs range, the config set, `.tool-versions`, and
the CI lanes move together in one commit
([ADR 0031](docs/adr/0031-self-enforcing-toolchain-and-tri-platform-build-bar.md)). The clone →
`deps.get` → compile → test contract must hold on macOS, Linux, and Windows; the full quality
battery is POSIX-only tooling (run it through CI or WSL on Windows). Focused boundary commands are
`mix architecture`, `mix audit`, `mix package.check`, `mix deps.currency`, and
`mix sbom.generate`. The architecture and archive allowlists must be expanded only with a reviewed
public protocol requirement and matching red-capable tests.

The local quality gate requires Gitleaks 8.30.1. `gitleaks version` must print `8.30.1` exactly.
On Linux x86_64, install the checksum-verified official binary with
`scripts/install_gitleaks.sh "$HOME/.local/bin"` and ensure that directory is on `PATH`. On other
platforms, install version 8.30.1 from the official Gitleaks release. Run `mix secrets` for the
merge-aware history, staged-index, and tracked-working-tree scans; `mix quality` runs the same gate.

## SDK publish topology

Cross-language verifier SDKs under `sdks/` are authored in this repository but **do not publish
from it**. Each SDK graduates to its own per-SDK repository (`bounded_authority_protocol_<lang>`)
on first publication; see [ADR 0015](docs/adr/0015-sdk-graduation-and-publish-topology.md). A
local pre-commit hook (`sh scripts/install-hooks.sh`) and a CI job on `main` reject SDK publish
infrastructure (registry-publish steps, `prepublishOnly`/`prepack` scripts, `publishConfig`)
committed to this repository. Contributor hook installation works without a confidential-term
inventory; owner-host checks activate through the local policy described below. The deliberate-admin bypass is `git commit --no-verify`, documented
here as the sanctioned escape hatch. Neither layer catches a literal ad-hoc publish command run
against a working tree — that is a runtime act no commit gate sees; CI on `main` is the hard gate
for committed infrastructure.

## Owner-host confidential-term checks

Owner-host confidential-term checks require an ignored identifier inventory, integrity policy,
and activation marker, plus activation recorded in local Git configuration. The inventory owner
prepares the inventory locally, then initializes its policy with
`python3 scripts/private_identifier_guard.py --repo "$PWD" initialize --expected-count COUNT`,
using the verified entry count. Install with `sh scripts/install-hooks.sh`. Routine installation
validates the existing policy; it does not accept a changed inventory. After activation, missing
or changed inputs fail closed even if the entire ignored policy directory is removed. Partial
owner-policy state without activation also denies. Contributor mode prints an inactive notice.
The installer refuses a configured alternate hooks path or a linked worktree before writing hooks.
Explicit initialization can accept an updated
inventory; the local owner remains trusted. Do not share the inventory or its digest in source,
reviews, issues, or CI.

These hooks check staged bytes, raw pending messages, and outgoing Git objects. Automatic merge,
cherry-pick, rebase, and mail-application commits can skip the commit checks; the pre-push check
is their local backstop. Creating a new remote ref scans its full ancestry, including commits
already retained under another remote ref.

The message hook rejects confidential terms even in editor comments, verbose diffs, or templates:
Git does not tell this hook which cleanup mode will later remove those bytes. For deletion-only
cleanup, stage the removal with `git rm -- path` and use an explicit clean message with
`git commit -m 'Remove obsolete material'`. Avoid including confidential paths in the message.

The public CI checks
directory classes and generic secret signatures; it cannot attest to confidential-term coverage.
Inventory-owner confirmation remains necessary, including for patent terms. Other hosts, web
edits, provider merge actions, and bypassed hooks remain outside local enforcement.

Do not submit secrets, production credentials, private key fixtures, customer data, or proprietary
consumer code. Runtime code, public APIs, wire formats, and conformance artifacts must remain
provider-neutral; boundary documentation may name consumers only to state exclusions and
dependency direction.

By contributing, you agree that your contribution is licensed under Apache License 2.0. No
contributor license agreement or DCO sign-off is currently required.

## Code of Conduct

By participating in this project you agree to uphold the [Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) (v2.1).